


# RESOLVING THE POWER CRISIS

Insights From Detailed Power System Modelling & Technical Analysis

17 APRIL 2023 MERIDIAN ECONOMICS





Our game plan to resolve the power crisis



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# 01

# INTRODUCTION TO MERIDIAN ECONOMICS



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# WHO WE ARE

- Meridian Economics is a specialized energy and climate economics consultancy and think tank that provides executive level decision support, strategic advice and analytics capabilities.
- We work at the intersection of economics, energy regulation, finance, and climate change policy.
- We are networked and engaged at a high level of policy making, with insights based on rigorous analysis.
- We pride ourselves on bringing our quantitative capabilities including rigorous financial analysis and modelling skills to bear on the questions faced by our clients.
- Our team includes highly skilled senior financial and power system analysts, and regulatory, energy and climate economists active in the South African energy space since the early 1990s, and the climate space domestically and internationally since the early 2000s.
- Most of our team have a background in engineering or science (MS or PhD)

#### Energy Sector Reform

- Eskom Financial and structural reforms
- Market and regulatory reforms
- Broader technological trends

#### Energy System Modelling

- Loadshedding resolution
- Electricity sector decarbonisation
- Pathways to Net Zero
- Firm level power supply

#### Infrastructure Economics and Finance

- Energy policy
- Regional, city level, and enterprise level energy strategy

#### Climate Policy Finance

Litigation and Regulation Risk

• Pricing disputes

Tariff regulation

- Coal retirement mechanism
- Just Transition funding
- Climate risk advisory
- Strategic pricing consulting




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### GIVEN THE HIGHLY CONTESTED NATURE OF THE POWER SECTOR WE FULLY BELIEVE IN OPEN MODELLING AND OPEN DATA



#### "IN GOD WE TRUST. ALL OTHERS MUST BRING DATA." - W.E. DEMMING

- Historically, commercial tools have been extensively utilised by both governments and utilities to develop power system capacity expansion plans.
- In the South African context, the modelling conducted by (or for) the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) for the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) has been based in the commercial software PLEXOS.
- One of the challenges of utilising commercial tools to support <u>transparent energy policy</u> is the closed nature of the models, which are essentially a 'black-box' for external parties. For this reason, open modelling initiatives are gaining traction globally, with the goal of creating platforms that are based on open-source software as well as open data, which will lower the barriers to entry to create a broader active modelling community in South Africa.










# OVERVIEW OF LOAD SHEDDING DATA TO DATE



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


# 6.6 TWH OF LOAD HAS ALREADY BEEN SHED YEAR TO DATE IN 2023











- Quantifying the broader economic cost of daily disruptions is challenging, with ongoing debates on the exact GDP impact, which includes lost production, investment, deindustrialization, increased unemployment, and declining livelihoods.
- Graph is based on Eskom submission to NERSA on cost of load shedding
  - Direct effect R29.05(GVA)/kWh
  - Total effect including long term damage to the economy R101.73(GVA)/kWh

Source of COUE: Eskom RT&D
























#### THE CURRENT ENERGY CRISIS WAS FORESEEABLE WITH CSIR WARNING BACK IN 2020 THAT LOAD SHEDDING WOULD INCREASE DRASTICALLY WITHOUT RAPID INTERVENTIONS

our future through science

Updated EAF & demand forecast indicates further shortage relative to IRP 2019 requiring capacity and significantly more energy



\* Estimated Eskom Demand Response (DR) capability (mostly industrial & energy limited); NOTES: Energy & capacity shortage is demand that cannot be served due to a lack of capacity (including OCGTs, pumped storage & Eskom DR); Outcomes shown are from deterministic simulations - thus indicative; 99<sup>th</sup> percentile of capacity & energy shortage is reported; All IRP 2019 capacity is assumed to come online as planned (Step 3 is always considered implemented); Cost of load shedding is estimated using COUE (cost of unserved energy) = 87.50 R/kWh; Sources: CSIR Energy Centre analysis

- Warnings by Eskom in various MTSAOs should have been heeded and actioned into an updated IRP.
- Effective energy planning cannot rely on best-case scenarios in terms of the Eskom performance.
- Eskom has not been able to attain EAF targets for their fleet and this is shown in their most recent System Status
  Outlook Briefing released in October
  2022 when plant availability was at
  58.53% versus a 65% target at year end for FY23.



# 03 INSIGHTS FROM LOAD SHEDDING IN 2021 AND 2022




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#### ESKOM SYSTEM OPERATIONS ARE CONSTANTLY BALANCING SUPPLY AND DEMAND IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE GRID FREQUENCY WITH THE RANGE OF 49-51 Hz

Resource



Pumped storage: Drakensberg Ingula Palmiet	2 732 MW 1 000 MW 1 332 MW 400 MW	90 UH, 22.5 SH 54 UH, 13.5 SH 58 UH, 29 SH
OCGT: Ankerlig Gourikwa Avon Dedisa	3 080 MW 1 326 MW 740 MW 680 MW 334 MW	326 UH, 36.2 SH 221 UH, 44.2 SH 210 UH, 52.5 SH 134 UH, 67 SH
GT: Accacia Port Rex	342 MW 171 MW 171 MW	27 UH, 9 SH 46 UH, 15.3 SH
ILS	2 024 MW	120 minutes per week
VPS	0 – 500 MW	4 days a week of 120 minutes 40 – 150 MW in winter Up to 500 MW in summer
Critical peak day	~27 MW	Pilot project
		e up 6 000 MW of dispatchable generation. If the etc al and the et

Constraint

Capacity

. ....

Below 49.2 Hz, additional automatic load shedding systems activate which can shed up to 50% of load in (<1s) if needed





# IT IS IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN BEING CAPACITY CONSTRAINED FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME IN THE EVENING PEAK AND BEING ENERGY CONSTRAINED ACROSS THE DAY


Example of load shedding for short duration evening peak (high plant availability, but high demand typical of winter)

Hours

Short duration of constraint requiring use of

emergency reserves or load shedding

Example of load shedding throughout the day (low plant availability, despite lower demand typical of summer)



Source: Eskom

01:00 to 02:00

00:00 to 01:00

35000

34000

33000

32000

31000

30000

29000

28000

27000

26000

25000

24000

23000

22000

21000

MW

Blue line is typical winter demand profile Red line is typical summer demand profile

00:00

23:00 to (



04:00 to 05:00

05:00 to 06:00 06:00 to 07:00 )7:00 to 08:00 08:00 to 09:00 09:00 to 10:00 10:00 to 11:00 11:00 to 12:00 12:00 to 13:00 13:00 to 14:00 [4:00 to 15:00 .5:00 to 16:00 l6:00 to 17:00 17:00 to 18:00 8:00 to 19:00 [9:00 to 20:00 20:00 to 21:00 21:00 to 22:00 2:00 to 23:00

03:00 to 04:00

12:00 to 03:00

Higher capacity available due

to lower planned outages

during winte



# PUMPED HYDRO STORAGE AND OCGTS ARE KEY RESERVES TO MAINTAIN SYSTEM STABILITY

HOWEVER, BOTH RESOURCES ARE ENERGY CONSTRAINED AND CANNOT BE UTILISED FOR LONG PERIODS AT HIGH LOAD FACTORS WITHOUT BEING REPLENISHED.



Image source: www.polity.org.za




Image source: Engineering News






# ACTUAL ESKOM SYSTEM DISPATCH FOR A WEEK INCLUDING STAGE 4-6 LOAD SHEDDING








STORAGE DAMS ARE FULL ON MONDAY AND EMPTY ON FRIDAY EVENING – THEREFORE EFFECTIVENESS TO MANAGE LOAD SHEDDING REDUCES LATER IN THE WEEK








#### ENERGY PROVIDED BY OCGTS IS PRIMARILY IN THE EVENING PEAK, BUT CONTRIBUTION THROUGHOUT THE DAY IS INCREASING AS THE SYSTEM BECOMES MORE CONSTRAINED






#### IN 2022 AND 2023 (YTD) THE SYSTEM WAS SO SHORT OF ENERGY THAT LOAD WAS CONSISTENTLY SHED ACROSS ALL HOURS OF THE WEEK, WITH HIGHER PEAKS IN THE EVENING






# SYSTEM OPERATOR CAPACITY OUTLOOK FOR THE NEXT 12 MONTHS










## ANALYSING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ADDITIONAL RENEWABLES WOULD HAVE MADE ON LOAD SHEDDING IN 2021 AND 2022






#### RAPID EXPANSION OF PRIVATE SECTOR SOLAR PV PROJECTS DUE TO THE LIFTING OF LICENSING RESTRICTIONS



Registered Capacity at February 2023




Hydro power
 Wind
 Solar PV
 Co-generation
 Solar PV and Gas to Power


Data from <u>NERSA registered Generation facilities</u>





#### CURRENT RE CONTEXT: THE CURRENT INSTALLED CAPACITY OF RENEWABLES IS 6280 MW, PRODUCING 16.2 TWH IN 2022









#### CURRENT RE CONTEXT: THE CAPACITY FACTORS ACROSS RETECHNOLOGIES HAS REMAINED CONSISTENT







# WE RECENTLY COMPLETED STUDIES TO MODEL DIFFERENT SCENARIOS TO RESOLVE THE POWER CRISIS

- Last year, we published a two-part series on exploring a feasible strategy to resolve the load shedding crisis:
  - In Part A, we utilised Eskom's actual data to investigate the impact that additional generation capacity would have had on load shedding if it had been in operation in 2021, focusing on the shortest lead-time and cheapest sources of power generation. Using two separate modelling platforms, we demonstrated how avoidable the load shedding crisis would have been resolved, whilst enabling more efficient operation of our power system and associated cost saving.
  - Part B outlines a Game Plan of critical interventions to end load shedding and emphasizes how applying a laser focus to implementing strategic policy levers, government can establish high confidence that the problem will be resolved expeditiously.
- In February, we repeated our analysis done in Part A using updated Eskom data from 2022, where we experienced four times more load shedding than in 2021.





### FLOW DIAGRAM SHOWING METHODOLOGY TO CALCULATE THE DIRECT IMPACT OF ADDITIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY



Additional Renewable Energy (RE) is calculated in each hour based on Eskom actual generation data



Any load shedding in an hour is offset by the additional RE available



If RE exceeds load shedding, the remaining energy offsets OCGT generation and diesel is saved for later use



If RE exceeds load shedding and OCGT generation, the remaining energy offsets PHS generation and water is left in the upper dam (reduces pumping need in evening)




Any remaining RE offsets coal generation



# DIFFERENT TYPES OF ENERGY SYSTEM MODELS ARE USED TO ADDRESS DIFFERENT PROBLEM TYPES








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
Modified from Mileva, Deshmukh. (2020) The GridPath Electricity Modelling Platform

#### WE ALSO USED A POWER SYSTEM DISPATCH MODEL TO SIMULATE HOW THE SO MIGHT HAVE RE-DISPATCHED PEAKING ASSETS HAD MORE RE BEEN AVAILABLE IN 2021 AND 2022





#### WE HAVE USED OUR POWER SYSTEM MODEL TO RECREATE THE MTSAO 2023-2027 SCENARIOS AND THE RESULTS ARE COMPARABLE WITH THE ESKOM MODELLING




Low EAF and low demand

2029

2030

Based on only capacity installed to date, validation was completed in Oct 2022, so not all of 2022 was modelled

#### WE HAVE USED OUR POWER SYSTEM MODEL TO RECREATE THE MTSAO 2023-2027 SCENARIOS AND THE RESULTS ARE COMPARABLE WITH THE ESKOM MODELLING



High EAF and low demand

2028

2027

2029

2030




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### INSIGHTS BASED ON ACTUAL ESKOM LOAD SHEDDING DATA:

5GW OF ADDITIONAL RENEWABLES WOULD HAVE REDUCED LOAD SHEDDING BY 96.5% IN 2021 WHICH REACHED 1.8 TWH (MLR)






### INSIGHTS BASED ON ACTUAL ESKOM LOAD SHEDDING DATA:




5GW OF ADDITIONAL RENEWABLES WOULD HAVE REDUCED LOAD SHEDDING BY 71% IN 2022, WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN FURTHER EXTENDED BY RELAXING DIESEL SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS, WITHOUT BURNING MORE DIESEL OVERALL






### INSIGHTS BASED ON ACTUAL ESKOM LOAD SHEDDING DATA:


5GW OF ADDITIONAL RENEWABLES WOULD HAVE REDUCED LOAD SHEDDING BY 71% IN 2022 AND BY 96.5% IN 2021, DEPENDING ON DIESEL SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS






# EXAMPLE OF SYSTEM DISPATCH WITH ADDITIONAL RE










#### EVEN WHEN RELYING ON ONLY PV DUE TO GRID CONSTRAINTS LOAD SHEDDING IS SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED




<sup>1</sup>Utility plants typically use single axis tracking to increase energy yield. kWp refers to the installed capacity on the DC side under standard conditions, whilst utility scale is maximum export AC

- Adding additional PV generation at the start of 2022 would have significantly reduced load shedding.
- For 5GW of utility scale PV load shedding in 2022 would have been 62% lower, whilst saving 25% on diesel costs.
- 5 GW of utility scale PV is equivalent to roughly 8 GWp of rooftop PV generation<sup>1</sup>.
- Using our system dispatch modelling, we are able to quantify the avoided costs in terms of load shedding, diesel and coal consumption.





#### THE SYSTEM SAVINGS ARE DETERMINED BY THE AMOUNT OF LOAD SHEDDING, DIESEL AND COAL CONSUMPTION THAT ARE OFFSET THROUGH THE ADDITIONAL PV ENERGY (2022 EXAMPLE)



- Loadshedding will always be offset first by additional PV energy when possible, followed by diesel and then coal.
- Virtually all energy from additional PV capacity, up to 1GW, goes directly into offsetting load shedding. shedding.
- As more PV is installed above 1GW the share that goes towards load shedding reduces but remains above 30% even at 10GW
- At 5GW of additional PV energy
  - o 47% offsets load shedding
  - o 9% offsets diesel
  - o 43% offsets coal
  - o 1% is lost through pumped hydro losses





### DEPLOYMENT OF SOLAR PV AND RELIEVING DIESEL SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS ARE CRITICAL SHORT-TERM SOLUTIONS

- Deployment of rooftop PV achievable rapidly at scale with appropriate incentives will have almost as much impact on load shedding as a more optimal mix that includes wind
  - Rooftop and distributed PV have the shortest lead time and is immune from transmission network constraints
- In the very short term, burning large volumes of diesel when required is the only means to address the current crisis and is economically rational.
- One of the main causes of load shedding is existing logistical supply constraints that hinder the ability for OCGTs to burn diesel when necessary
  - Doubling the available diesel storage at the OCGT plants can enhance diesel usage and further mitigate load shedding.
- Beyond the very short term, as more RE is rapidly added to South Africa's power system, improved diesel logistics can provide enough diesel to ensure continuous supply to the OCGTs for shorter intense usage periods



# 03 OUR GAME PLAN TO RESOLVE THE POWER CRISIS



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#### THE GAME PLAN

RAPIDLY INCREASING ENERGY RESOURCES IN LINE WITH A 'RISK ADJUSTED RESOURCE PLAN' IS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE LOAD SHEDDING IN 2-3 YEARS

25

20

15

10


5

2021

Added Capacity [GW]

#### These include to:


- Get as much capacity as possible online from the RMIPPPP and REIPPPP BW5 projects through increasing the likelihood that these projects can close, and minimise further PPA signature delays;
- **Expand REIPPPP BW6** by more than double and strengthen incentives for earlier connection;
- Rapidly accelerate the uptake of <1 MW and 100MW projects by increasing market incentives;
- Obtain **additional energy** from the multitude of existing and new projects (big and small) that are distributed throughout the grid;
- Urgently install **additional thermal peaking capacity** and expanded diesel storage at existing peakers;
- Procure a large amount of Demand Response (DR) capacity from DR aggregators and a large amount of additional battery storage.







# THE SUITE OF ADDITIONAL ENERGY RESOURCES REQUIRED BY 2024 IN A 'RISK ADJUSTED RESOURCE PLAN'







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